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“It is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy.”1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court of Canada has provided an expanding 
framework of labour rights that are protected by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of association2 under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.3 It has 
now been recognized that freedom of association in the labour context protects the 
rights to form, join, and maintain trade unions, including a right to choice of 
bargaining agent which is independent from one’s employer; to collectively bargain, 
including a duty on employers to bargain in good faith; and to strike.  
 
But despite the, unquestionably profound, changes in s. 2(d) jurisprudence, 
the reach of freedom of association under the Charter remains limited. This is 
because the Charter applies only to government action or government actors, not to 
private parties or the relationships between private parties.4 Hence, while the Charter 
will apply directly to labour relations between a government and its employees,5 that 
is because of the government’s role as legislator, not as an employer qua employer. 
The Charter does not directly protect workers within the private sector.6 In other 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan. I would like to thank my anonymous 
peer reviewers, particularly the inimitable Peer Reviewer #1, whose detailed notes left this paper, I think, 
much-improved; and thanks to the student editors of the UNB Law Journal for their unfailing courtesy. 
 
1 Ashby v White (1703), 92 ER 126 [Ashby]. 
 
2 See in particular Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British 
Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [BC Health Services]; Ontario (AG) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, 
[2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser]; Mounted Police Assn of Ontario v Canada, 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 SCR 3 
[MPAO]; Meredith v Canada, 2015 SCC 2, [2015] 1 SCR [Meredith]; and Saskatchewan Federation of 
Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245 [SFL]. 
 
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
 
4 Ibid at s 32(1). See also RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 573, 33 DLR (4th) 174 and Hill 
v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at para 95, 126 DLR (4th) 129. 
 
5 BC Health Services, supra note 2 at para 88. 
 
6 Though the constitutional protections would seem to indirectly protect private sector workers by 
preventing governments from eliminating existing statutory protections of section 2(d) rights; or even, in 
some cases, by placing a positive obligation upon governments to provide statutory protections to those 
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words, the Charter does not itself require private sector employers to collectively 
bargain with their employees; it does not relieve workers or unions of liability in tort 
for strike activity;7 it does not even render collective agreements enforceable as 
contracts at common law.8 Such rights and obligations arise under labour relations 
legislation, not from the Charter directly. 
 
That said, freedom of association is also protected under human rights 
legislation.9 In some cases, application of the freedom is specifically limited to 
review of other legislation; the human right statute’s purpose is to ensure that the 
rights and freedoms protected therein are respected within other legislation. 10 More 
germane to this article, however, is where a province or territory has included 
freedom of association within its human rights code. Such inclusion is admittedly 
uncommon – only Yukon, Saskatchewan, and Québec have done so to date.11 
However such inclusion, when coupled with the Supreme Court’s purposive 
approach to freedom of association, arguably places the same obligations that are 
currently upon public employers – a duty to collectively bargain, a duty not to 
retaliate against employees who strike – directly upon private employers.12 And this 
may be true even – or especially – for those workers who are not “unionized” 13 
                                                                                                                   
currently excluded from, for instance, trade union legislation: see Dunmore v Ontario, 2001 SCC 94, 
[2001] 3 SCR 1016 [Dunmore]. 
 
7 While strikes are no longer forbidden under the common law (Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Zambri, 
[1962] SCR 609, 34 DLR (2d) 654, strikers could be and can still be liable for numerous torts. For a 
general and still relevant review, see IM Christie’s seminal The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort: A 
Comparative Study of the Law in England and Canada (Kingston: Queen’s University Press, 1967) and 
Harry Arthurs, “Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada; Some Problems in Judicial Workmanship” (1960) 38 
Can Bar Rev 346. See also RWDSU Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd, [2002] 1 SCR 
156 at para 73, 208 DLR (4th) 385 (continuing applicability of tort law in restraining picketing). 
 
8 Young v CNR, [1931] 1 DLR 645, [1931] AC 83 [Young], (collective agreements are not enforceable at 
common law). While unions have often been granted “personhood” under labour legislation (for example, 
s 6-3 of The Saskatchewan Employment Act, SS 2013, c S-15.1 (SEA), states that “for the purposes of this 
Act, every union is deemed to be a person”), such status is often limited to the scope of the statute in 
question. And while unions also have sufficient legal status to, for instance, be found liable for contempt, 
as in United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta (AG), [1992] 1 SCR 901, 89 DLR (4th) 609, that does not mean 
that there will be the necessary privity of contract to convert individual contracts of employment to a 
legally binding collective agreement in the absence of a statutory declaration to that effect.  
 
9 The Charter is of course also a “human rights” statute, and in using the term “human rights legislation” I 
am not suggesting that the Charter is something other than what it is. For the purposes of this article, 
however, I will use the term “human rights legislation” or “human rights code” to distinguish “mere” 
statutes from the constitutional human rights protections found in the Charter. 
 
10 The Alberta Bill of Rights, RSA 2000, c A-14, and the Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44.  
 
11 The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1, s 6 [SHRC]; the Yukon Human Rights Act, 
RSY 2002, c 116, s 5 [YHRA]; The Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, RSQ c C-12 at s 3 [Québec 
Charter].  
 
12 As I will explore further below, for the purposes of enforcement, the Yukon and Saskatchewan statutes, 
at least, do not distinguish between fundamental freedoms and anti-discrimination provisions. 
 
13 I recognize here that Professor Roy Adams, for one, takes issue with the Canadian tendency to equate 
“represented by a certified bargaining agent” to “unionized”, as there are other ways to “unionize” outside 
of the Wagner Act model of labour relations: Roy Adams, “Fraser v Ontario and International Human 
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under the relevant labour relations legislation, and who therefore cannot take 
advantage of the statutory protections that currently exist for workers who are 
covered, or who are seeking to be covered, by that legislation. 
 
This presents a conundrum. On the one hand, if freedom of association is 
guaranteed within a provincial statute, why cannot workers (or indeed anyone) 
exercise that freedom on the terms set out by the Supreme Court under the Charter? 
On the other hand, is it a given that the two freedoms of association are equivalent? 
And might enforcement of a provincial freedom of association undermine or 
destabilize the existing labour relations legislation that the Supreme Court has taken 
pains to reinforce in its section 2(d) jurisprudence? 
 
What I explore in this article, therefore, is the potential of provincial human 
rights codes in promoting and protecting freedom of association and labour rights for 
non-unionized workers.14 I am less concerned with the use of freedom of association 
to challenge legislative provisions; that can also be done using the Charter, and 
while it may be arguable that at least some elements of Canadian labour relations 
regimes are unconstitutional, 15 that is not my focus here, though that aspect of the 
inquiry will become more relevant when dealing with the right to strike. 
 
It is hardly self-evident, however, that human rights commissions are a 
possible (or appropriate) venue to pursue associational rights. There are numerous 
issues that must be addressed in making this argument. The issues I will address 
therefore are, in order: first, whether human rights commissions can, or should, be 
used to enforce freedom of association; second, whether freedom of association 
under human rights codes is the equivalent to freedom of association under the 
Charter; and third, what freedom of association under human rights codes might 
look like in application. In terms of application, I will examine the less controversial 
applications – freedom of association as an aspirational principle, as a principle used 
in interpreting other legislation, and as a complementary remedy within labour 
arbitrations – and then the more controversial – specifically the duty to recognize 
                                                                                                                   
Rights: A Comment” (2009) 14 CLELJ 378 at 387 and “A Pernicious Euphoria: 50 years of Wagnerism in 
Canada” (1995) 3 CLELJ 321. However, for convenience’s sake, I will uphold the general practice and 
refer to workers who are represented by a certified bargaining agent as “unionized”, for the most part, and 
those who are not as “non-unionized”. There is some ambiguity here, as workers who are represented by 
an exclusive bargaining agent that is uncertified, but voluntarily recognized by the employer, would also 
usually be seen as “unionized”; where such distinctions become relevant I will be more precise in my 
nomenclature. 
 
14 As discussed later in the paper, where workers fall under the existing protections of labour relations 
legislation, the necessity and desirability of human rights commissions entertaining associational rights 
complaints are much reduced. 
 
15 For instance, I have previously argued that the statutory restrictions on sympathetic action, such as 
workers refusing to cross another union’s picket line, are unconstitutional: Keir Vallance, “’Lest You 
Undermine Our Struggle: Sympathetic Action and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2015) 
53:1 Alta L Rev 139 [Vallance, “Lest You Undermine”]. 
 UNBLJ   RD UN-B  [VOL/TOME 68 
 
256 
 
employee associations (especially those without majority support within the 
workplace), the duty to bargain in good faith, and the right to strike. 
 
I should add that nothing I say here should be taken to suggest that 
governments cannot or should not amend existing labour relations legislation to 
expand the range of protections or the range of workers who are covered. Of course, 
governments can do so; and perhaps should, given the limited success of the existing 
regime in promoting collective bargaining.16 For that matter, governments in 
Saskatchewan, Yukon, and Québec could remove freedom of association from their 
human rights codes or restrict the application of fundamental freedoms to review of 
other legislation. However, in the absence of legislative will one way or the other, it 
may be that the courts (or as I will argue, human rights commissions) may provide 
an alternative avenue for labour rights.17 And at a more basic level, my focus is, 
simply put, on the implications that arise from the existing legislative guarantees of 
freedom of association. We already have the right; what, then, is our remedy?18 
 
A final introductory point: While the focus of this paper is labour law, the 
interaction between Charter rights and provincial human rights codes, and labour 
rights and human rights, may be of more general interest. In the vein of this issue of 
the University of New Brunswick Law Journal, the issues raised herein have 
constitutional and administrative law implications. The interaction between 
constitutional Charter freedoms and the equivalent quasi-constitutional freedoms 
within human rights legislation is not limited to freedom of association; though 
association is perhaps the most complicated in application, given the positive 
obligations inherent in the section 2(d) jurisprudence. The use of human rights 
commissions to enforce fundamental freedoms also raises significant administrative 
law implications, with an administrative tribunal potentially being asked to deal with 
issues outside of its institutional competence; and with two competing tribunals 
(human rights commissions and labour relations boards) potentially dealing with 
identical or similar issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 In 2011, for example, just over 31 per cent of Canadian employees were covered by a collective 
agreement, but this number is misleading because while almost 75 per cent of public sector workers were 
covered, only 17.5% of private sector workers were: Canada, Statistics Canada, Unionization 2011, by 
Sharanjit Uppal, Catalogue no. 75-001-x (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2011), online: StatsCan 
<www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2011004/article/11579-eng.pdf>. In the private sector this was a 
decline from 21.3% in 1997 and 19% in 2004: Roy Adams, Labour Left Out: Canada’s Failure to Protect 
and Promote Collective Bargaining as a Human Right (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
2005) at 21 [Adams, Labour Left Out]. 
 
17 In a similar vein, see Roy Adams, “Bringing Canada’s Wagner Act Regime into Compliance with 
International Human Rights Law and the Charter” (2016) 19:2 CLELJ 365 [Adams, “Compliance”]. 
 
18 As stated by McLachlin J (as she then was) in Watkins v Olafson, [1989] 2 SCR 750 at 767, 61 DLR 
(4th) 577, paraphrasing Ashby, supra note 1: “Where there is a right, there must also be a remedy.” 
2017] THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB? 
 
 
 
257 
2. Non-Wagnerist Labour Rights for the Non-Unionized 
 
Canadian labour relations legislation is based on the American “Wagner Act”.19 
Union representation of workers under Wagner Act-style (or “Wagnerist”) legislation 
is premised on two key principles: majoritarianism and exclusivity. If workers wish 
to collectively bargain with their employer, they must first become members of a 
bargaining unit certified by the relevant Labour Relations Board. Within the 
proposed bargaining unit, a majority of the workers must vote to be represented by 
the applicant union – majoritarianism – and then only the applicant union may 
represent those workers – exclusivity – unless and until the union is displaced by 
another union or the workers choose to decertify. If the union is successful, then it 
becomes the bargaining agent for all workers in the bargaining unit and the employer 
and union both have a statutory duty to bargain in good faith and make efforts to 
conclude a collective agreement. 20 If the applicant union is unsuccessful in 
becoming the bargaining agent for the bargaining unit, however – if it fails to obtain 
majority support within the unit – then the employer is under no legal obligation 
whatsoever to collectively bargain with either its employees, or any union. 
 
Canadian labour relations legislation is also characterized by strict control 
of strike activity. Workers who are not represented by a certified bargaining agent 
cannot, generally speaking, strike. 21 Workers who undertake such action will be seen 
to have breached, or even repudiated, their contracts of employment.22 And workers 
who are represented by a certified bargaining agent are governed by the so-called 
“peace obligation” which prohibits any strike during the term of a collective 
agreement.23 Where workers historically used the strike to force an employer to 
recognize and bargain with their union, they now use the certification process and 
                                                 
19 National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC §§ 151-169 (Wagner Act). I will also use the terms “Wagnerist” 
or “Wagnerism” when discussing labour relations statutes or principles based on the Wagner Act. 
 
20 See e.g. the SEA, supra note 8 at s 6-7 (duty to bargain in good faith) and 6-62(1)(d) and 6-63(1)(c) 
(unfair labour practice for employers or unions, respectively, to fail to bargain in good faith); Canada 
Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2, Part 1, Div IV. 
 
21 For example, s 6-63(1)(d) of the SEA sets out that it is an unfair labour practice for an employee to, inter 
alia, take part in a strike unless a “strike vote is taken, and a majority of employees who vote do vote in 
favour of a strike”, while s 6-32 provides that “no employee shall strike before a vote has been taken by 
the employees in the bargaining unit affected and the majority of those employees who vote have voted 
for a strike”. The prohibition here is both explicit (no employee shall strike) and implicit (by definition, 
unorganized workers do not have a “bargaining unit” as defined under the SEA). The interaction between 
such provisions and situations where an employer has voluntarily recognized an uncertified bargaining 
agent is not always clear. See also Roy Adams, Industrial Relations Under Liberal Democracy 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995) at 89; Peter Barnacle, Roderick Wood, Geoffrey 
England & Innis Christie, Employment Law in Canada, 4th ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2005) at 
11-10 
 
22 See e.g. Reference Re Public Service Employees Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR 313, 38 DLR (4th) 
161. [Alberta Reference] at paras 176-77, per McIntyre J. 
 
23 See e.g. SEA, s 6-30; Canada Labour Code, s 88.1. See also generally Geoffrey England, “Some 
Thoughts on the Peace Obligation” (1980) 12:52 Ottawa Law Rev 521. 
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the statutory “duty to bargain in good faith”. Where strikes were once the means by 
which collective agreements were enforced,24 disputes between employers and their 
unionized employees are now handled through statutorily-mandated labour 
arbitration.25 
 
Outside of labour relations legislation, labour rights such as collective 
bargaining and the right to strike are fragile. Consider non-unionized workers 
undertaking strike action. This could include activity such as the “fast food strikes” 
or the “Fight for 15”26 in the United States, where low-wage workers walked off the 
job en masse to militate for a higher minimum wage and more effective protection of 
union organizing. Or it could include less dramatic action such as Icelandic women 
collectively leaving work two hours early to protest the 30 per cent wage gap 
between women and men.27 Such action would not be protected – indeed, would be 
illegal – under Canadian labour relations statutes. The workers would be liable for 
discipline or dismissal owing to their individual breaches of contract. 
 
Consider also a situation where workers wish to collectively bargain with 
their employer, but they either cannot obtain the majority support necessary to certify 
a bargaining agent under the labour relations legislation in their jurisdiction, or they 
do not wish to avail themselves of the rights, protections, and obligations that labour 
relations legislation would provide. Their employer has no duty to negotiate with 
them; Wagnerism is, as Professor David Doorey has described it, an “all or nothing” 
affair.28  
 
A helpful approach to labour rights, and one that I will adopt in my 
discussion, is Professor Doorey’s characterization of labour rights as “thick” and 
“thin”.29 The “thinnest” right is what the Supreme Court has referred to as 
“constitutive” freedom of association – the right to form, belong, and maintain 
worker associations.30 “Thicker” rights include the right to exercise a “right of 
                                                 
24 See Young, supra note 8. 
 
25 See SEA, s 6-45ff; Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1, s 135. 
 
26 E.g. Adam Edelman, “Thousands of airport, fast food workers across U.S. plan strike”, New York Daily 
News (21 November 2016), online: <www.nydailynews.com/news/national/thousands-airport-fast-food-
workers-u-s-plan-strike-article-1.2882236>; Justin Worland, “Fast Food Workers Strike in 270 Cities to 
Demand $15 Minimum Wage” Time (November 10, 2016), online: <time.com/4106133/fast-food-
workers-strike>; Alana Semuels, “Fast-food workers walk out in NY amid rising US labor unrest” Los 
Angeles Times (29 November 2012), online: <articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/29/business/la-fi-mo-fast-
food-strike-20121129>. While the strikes have focused on raising the national minimum wage in the 
United States to fifteen dollars per hour, they have also included demands for labour rights and the right to 
organize without fear of retaliation. 
 
27 Uri Friedman, “Why Thousands of Women in Iceland Left Work Two Hours Early This Week” The 
Atlantic (27 October 2016), online: <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/iceland-women-
gender-pay-gap/505460/>. 
 
28 David Doorey, "Graduated Freedom of Association: Worker Voice Beyond the Wagner Model" (2012), 
38:2 Queen's LJ. 
 
29 Ibid. 
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association” without being “punished, terminated or interfered with” by one’s 
employer; the right to make “collective representations” to an employer through an 
association; and an obligation on an employer to “receive collective employee 
representations, and to engage in ‘meaningful dialogue’ and consider representations 
‘in good faith’”.31 The “thickest” rights are those found under Wagnerist labour 
relations legislation – a right to strike (on the terms allowed under the legislation) 
without penalty; access to grievance arbitration, interest arbitration, and/or mediation 
to assist with collective bargaining; and a statutory duty to bargain in good faith.32 
Some of the rights that he categorized as “thickest” (the right to strike, to full 
collective bargaining, and to mediation and arbitration; as well as a duty to bargain in 
good faith)33 have arguably now been constitutionalized in SFL (the right to strike)34 
and BC Health Services and Fraser (a constitutional duty to bargain in good faith).35  
 
To further apply Professor Doorey's categorization, my focus in this article 
is on the "thinner" and "thicker" labour rights – but not the "thickest" (i.e. Wagnerist) 
rights.36 I am not suggesting that human rights commissions be called upon to create 
and adjudicate a comprehensive labour code, nor that they insert themselves 
wholesale into matters properly before a labour relations board.37  
 
In addressing labour rights outside of existing labour statutes, the Charter is 
of limited help. The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that Wagnerism is, in 
                                                                                                                   
30 Ibid at 533; MPAO, supra note 2 at para 52. 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 SFL, supra note 2 at paras 3, 24, 77. 
 
35 BC Health Services, supra note 2 at para 90; Fraser, supra note 2 at paras 40ff. See also Justice 
Rothstein’s dissent in MPAO, supra note 2 at para 169. 
 
36 Note however that I do consider the right to strike later in the paper. 
 
37 Practically speaking, human rights legislation generally grants its Commission the discretion to refuse to 
accept a complaint where the subject matter of the complaint has been adequately dealt with elsewhere: 
see YHRA, s 20(1)(h) and (i): the commission shall investigate a complaint unless “… the complainant has 
not exhausted grievance or review procedures which are otherwise reasonably available or procedures 
provided for under another Act…”; or “the substance of the complaint has already been dealt with in 
another proceeding”; SHRC, supra note 11 at s 27(1)(d): the commission may dismiss a complaint if “the 
substance of the complaint has been appropriately dealt with pursuant to another Act or proceeding”. 
Where a worker or a group of workers has availed, or attempted to avail, themselves of Wagner Act-style 
legislation, they gain access to the rights, protections, and obligations of that regime. Again, such rights 
and protections may not extend beyond that specific statute or regime. See e.g. SEA, supra note 10, s 6-
62(1)(a) (an employer may not “interfere with, restrain, intimidate, threaten, or coerce an employee in the 
exercise of any right conferred by this Part” (emphasis added); similar restrictions appear under 6-62(1)(g) 
(discrimination in terms and conditions of employment), while the duty to bargain is limited to bargaining 
with a “bargaining unit” (6-62(1)(d)). The implication seems to be that labour rights outside of the Act are 
not so protected. Notably the Canada Labour Code’s protections (s 94) are not so limited, though strike 
activity is only protected insofar as it is permitted by the Code (s 94(3)(a)(vi)). 
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general, constitutional.38 While exclusion of a group of workers from a Wagnerist 
statute, or at least from protections comparable to those within a Wagnerist statute, 
might be unconstitutional,39 the Court has shown little appetite to overturn the 
Wagnerist model. But the Charter is not entirely without application. If an employer 
were to pursue an unfair labour practice against non-unionized employees who went 
on strike, an argument could be made that the prohibition on strikes is 
unconstitutional.40 It is more likely, however, that an employer would simply either 
dismiss striking employees, or accept their repudiation of their contracts of 
employment, rather than pursue an ULP – though it is perhaps also arguable that the 
values underlying the Charter41 would dictate that such strikes would not be 
considered breaches, or at least not repudiation, of contract by employees.42 
 
I would argue, however, that freedom of association under human rights 
legislation might provide meaningful protection of labour rights. In particular, in 
relying upon a human rights code, a claimant is not dependent upon “Charter 
values”; the human rights protection will apply to private employers and to the 
common law directly. The procedural protections under human rights legislation may 
also provide greater access to labour rights for those workers not represented by an 
established union. And if nothing else, placing freedom of association within human 
rights legislation can serve as an aspirational statement about the value of labour 
rights.43  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 See MPAO, supra note 2 at paras 94–95 (Wagner Act model is one possible model); SFL, supra note 2 
at para 101-102 (legislative amendments making it more difficult to unionize under Wagner Act model 
nonetheless constitutional). 
 
39 See MPAO, supra note 2; Dunmore, supra note 6. 
 
40 Though equally arguably justified under section 1. See Brian Etherington, “The Right to Strike Under 
the Charter after Saskatchewan Federation of Labour: Applying the New Standard to Existing Regulation 
of Strike Activity” (2016) 19 CLELJ 492. 
 
41 See e.g. Hill, supra note 4 at para 91. 
 
42 See again Vallance, “Lest you Undermine”, supra note 15.  
 
43 That said, Professor Adams made a similar argument over ten years ago about the 
aspirational/educational value of including freedom of association in human rights legislation: Adams, 
Labour Left Out, supra note 16 at 39–40. The argument has merit, but I cannot help but note that 
Saskatchewan has had freedom of association in its human rights legislation since 1947 (The 
Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act, 1947, SS 1947, c 35, s 5), with little or no observable impact on the state 
of the law in that province. Perhaps the newly-expanded scope of freedom of association that has now 
been recognized by the Supreme Court will revitalize this argument. 
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3.  Human Rights Commissions and Fundamental Freedoms 
 
 
i. Human Rights Commissions as an Appropriate Venue 
 
It may at first blush seem absurd to suggest that workers pursue freedom of 
association complaints before human rights commissions and tribunals.44 For reasons 
that follow, I suggest the concept is not as far-fetched as it may appear and, indeed, 
the Supreme Court's freedom of association jurisprudence may require us to consider 
the possibility. At the most basic level, freedom of association does, after all, appear 
within the human rights codes in question. That suggests on the face of it that it 
should be taken as seriously as other provisions within the statute. Further, the 
Supreme Court has again invited exploration of these issues in its administrative law 
jurisprudence. The traditional hostility of courts to the ability of human rights 
commissions and tribunals45 to interpret their “home statutes” has faded, and a more 
deferential standard of review regarding decisions of administrative tribunals has 
become the norm.46 Commensurate with that relaxed standard is, perhaps, a greater 
ability of commissions and tribunals to engage with and interpret previously 
unexplored territory within the wording of their statutes, particularly when it is 
serving to extend the reach of a right also protected under the Charter.47 
 
I will note here also that as far as enforcement is concerned, the Yukon and 
Saskatchewan statutes do not distinguish between bill of rights portions and non-
discrimination portions of the statute. There is therefore no statutory bar to 
proceeding with a human rights complaint, including investigation by the 
Commission or subsequent litigation, regarding violation or infringement of a 
                                                 
44 I will note at the outset that in Yukon, Saskatchewan, and Québec, it falls upon the human rights 
commission to accept, investigate, mediate, and carry forward human rights complaints. However, in 
Saskatchewan, it now falls upon the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, not a human rights tribunal, 
to adjudicate any complaints that proceed to a hearing: SHRC, supra note 11 at s 29.6. Yukon and Québec 
retain administrative tribunals – a board of adjudication and a human rights tribunal,  respectively – as the 
adjudicative body: see YHRA, supra note 11 at s 22 and Québec Charter, supra note 11 at s 78-82. 
 
45 Canada (CHRC) v Canada (AG), [2011] 3 SCR 471 [Mowat] at paras 19-20.  
 
46 E.g. Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47 at para 22, 
[2016] 2 SCR 293. See also McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 
SCR 895; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 
61, [2011] 3 SCR 654; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir]; R v 
Conway, 2010 SCC 22 at paras 81-84, [2010] 1 SCR 765 [Conway] (administrative tribunals’ ability to 
apply the Charter). See also Paul Daly, “Canada’s Bipolar Administrative Law: Time for Fusion” (2014) 
40:1 Queen’s LJ 213 at 218. 
 
47 Indeed, I would suggest that it would be an error if a human rights commission were to refuse to take on 
a freedom of association complaint based only on the fact that workers could pursue certification under 
another Act. After all, the Supreme Court has stated that the Wagner Act model has not been 
constitutionalized. To interpret freedom of association to mean simply compliance with a Wagner Act– 
style labour relations statute seems not merely to limit but outright ignore a right given by a quasi -
constitutional statute. 
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person’s freedom of association.48 The Québec Charter differs in that its 
investigative functions seem limited to the statute’s anti-discrimination provisions,49 
and human rights complaints must be within the “sphere of investigation of the 
commission.”50 The Québec Charter does, however, have a “catch-all” investigative 
provision which allows the Commission to investigate “any act of reprisal or 
attempted reprisals and into any other act or omission which, in the opinion of the 
commission, constitutes an offence under this Charter…”51 Nonetheless, the Québec 
commission’s mandate to accept and investigate human rights complaints regarding 
freedom of association is more ambiguous than under the Yukon and Saskatchewan 
statutes. 
 
It should be noted, though, that the Québec Charter does provide the 
Commission with the ability to identify where legislation has violated the Québec 
Charter, though its power is only to recommend changes to the government.52 Both 
the YHRA and the SHRC provide that each Act takes precedence over other 
legislation.53 In the SHRC, statutory provisions that are inconsistent with the Code 
are “inoperative”, while under the YHRA the Act “supersedes” other legislation. 
Neither statute expressly provides the power to strike down legislation. However, the 
Charter can be used for that purpose insofar as freedom of association is statutorily 
infringed. 
  
The Supreme Court’s constitutional and administrative law jurisprudence 
invite exploration. But furthermore, the purposes of the various statutes, regimes, and 
areas of law at play here – the Charter, human rights legislation, and labour law - are 
also eminently compatible. The purposes of both freedom of association and of 
human rights legislation are arguably furthered by enforcement of labour rights 
under human rights statutes. The Supreme Court has confirmed that freedom of 
association should be interpreted generously and purposively;54 that it is “aimed at 
reducing social imbalances, not enhancing them;”55 that it “prevents individuals from 
being overwhelmed by the powerful while at the same time providing collective 
strength.”56 While s. 2(d)’s purpose may be to protect individuals from “state-
enforced isolation”,57 freedom of association under human rights legislation is not so 
                                                 
48 YHRA, supra note 11, s 20 (“a contravention of this Act”); SHRC, supra note 11 at s 27 (“contravened a 
provision of this Act”). 
 
49 Québec Charter, supra note 11 at s 71(1).  
 
50 Ibid at s 74. 
 
51 Ibid at s 71(9). 
 
52 Ibid at s 71(6) 
 
53 SHRC, supra note 11 at s 44; YHRA, supra note 11 at s 39.  
 
54 MPAO, supra note 2, para 5. 
 
55 Ibid at para 59 
 
56 Ibid at para 70. 
 
57 Ibid at 58, citing the Alberta Reference at 365 [emphasis added]. 
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restricted. Using human rights codes to extend the reach of a now-recognized 
constitutional right seems compatible with, albeit not a direct application of, the 
Supreme Court’s expansion of administrative tribunals’ ability to apply Charter 
remedies.58 
 
Similarly, human rights legislation has a special, quasi-constitutional59 
status and should be interpreted liberally and purposively.60 And certainly a number 
of the types of complaints that could involve freedom of association, at least, are in 
essence discrimination cases (i.e. reprisal for union involvement or union or strike 
activity). There seems no reason why the Commission’s expertise could not be 
turned to preventing discrimination on the basis of union activity; and indeed the 
existence of freedom of association within the Code suggests that workers have a 
right to freedom from anti-union discrimination – “right of non-reprisal”, in 
Professor Doorey’s words.61 
 
When applying freedom of association to labour law, it is also important to 
consider the underlying purposes of labour law. Professor Doorey has framed the 
goal of labour law as the “facilitation of employee voice,”62 while Professor Beth 
Bilson has suggested that worker participation and self-determination are rights in 
themselves, not merely means to an end.63 The value of freedom of association in the 
workplace was recognized by the majority in MPAO, citing Dickson CJ in the 
Alberta Reference – that association was of most value to those who were “liable to 
be prejudiced by the actions of some larger and more powerful entity, like the 
government or an employer.”64 In the Alberta Reference, Dickson CJ also noted that 
collective bargaining enhanced the “human dignity, liberty and autonomy of works 
by giving them the opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules and 
thereby gain some control over a major aspect of their lives, namely their work…”65  
 
Finally, the purpose and values underlying the Charter – “human dignity, 
equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the enhancement of 
                                                 
58 See, e.g., Conway, supra note 46. 
 
59 ICBC v Heerspink, [1982] 2 SCR 145, 137 DLR (3d) 219; Ontario Human Rights Commission v 
Simpson– Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 52 OR (2d) 799. 
 
60 Gould v Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 SCR 571 at para 5, 133 DLR (4th) 449 [Gould] (“a fair, 
large and liberal interpretation with a view to advancing its objects”); Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the 
Construction of Statutes, 5th ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2008) at 497.  
 
61 Doorey, supra note 28 at 528–529. 
 
62 Ibid at 520. See also MPAO, supra note 2 at paras 55, 87. 
 
63 Beth Bilson, “Future Tense: Some Thoughts About Labour Law Reform” (2005) 12 CLELJ 233 at 256, 
259. 
 
64 MPAO, supra note 2 at para 57. 
 
65 Alberta Reference, supra note 22 at para 82. 
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democracy”66 – are close to the stated purposes of human rights legislation. The 
SHRC, for example, provides that the Code is meant to “promote recognition of the 
inherent dignity and the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family” 
and to “further public policy in Saskatchewan that every person is free and equal in 
dignity and rights and to discourage and eliminate discrimination”.67 To this I will 
add one more related point: access to justice. Unlike Charter litigation, human rights 
legislation places emphasis on conciliation and settlement prior to recourse to an 
adversarial hearing process.68 There is a greater potential, perhaps for parties to 
mediate or otherwise resolve their dispute within the human rights framework - the 
process is arguably less adversarial than that within the Wagnerist model of labour 
relations. If the goal of labour rights is employee "voice", then resolution by the 
parties themselves would continue to be a priority within the human rights process 
(as it ostensibly is within labour relations legislation). Human rights commissions 
potentially have a greater emphasis on the good of society generally – the social 
good – rather than merely justice between the parties – workplace justice.69 This, at 
least in theory, places greater emphasis on social relationships and harmony over 
individualistic conflict. It is when a dispute is “closed to conciliation and mediation” 
that “human rights law and procedures [enter] the realm of the semijudicial.”70 In 
situations where individuals are attempting to exercise their labour rights, possibly 
without the assistance of an established union and the accompanying resources and 
expertise, such access to justice concerns seem relevant. 
 
At the same time, the carriage of a complaint by a human rights commission 
may by its very nature disempower or delegitimize employee voice. A human rights 
Commission may have a final say on whether a settlement negotiated between the 
parties is acceptable71 and may refuse to proceed with a complaint if a complainant 
has refused an offer of settlement that the Commission views as fair.72 Employee 
voice or employee interests may be subordinated to the Commission's view of what 
is fair, or what is in the broader interest. While the means of enforcement of 
"thinner" labour rights may be available under human rights legislation, there is by 
no means a guarantee that they will be exercised in a manner that respects or 
promotes the principle (per Professor Bilson) of "self-determination" which, at least 
ostensibly, underlies collective bargaining under labour relations legislation. 
                                                 
66 Ibid at para 81. 
 
67 SHRC, supra note 11 at s 3. 
 
68 Brian R Howe & David Johnson, Restraining Equality: Human Rights Commissions in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 11, 43; see SHRC, supra note 11 at s 28. See also Scowby 
v Glindenning, 148 DLR (3d) 55, 1983 CanLII 2065 (SKCA) (rev'd on other grounds [1986] 2 SCR 226) 
at paras 19, 22 (emphasis on amicable resolution). 
 
69 However, this also raises the uncomfortable question of to what extent labour rights should be 
subordinate to the "greater good," though Wagnerism already unquestionably does so in many ways (e.g. 
emphasizing industrial peace via the peace obligation). 
 
70 Ibid at 46.  
 
71 SHRC, supra note 11 at s 28(2.1). 
 
72 Ibid at s 29.5(2); YHRA, supra note 11 at s 20(1)(g). 
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ii. The Risks of “Labour Rights as Human Rights” 
 
In following this line of reasoning, it is also important to note that pursuing 
freedom of association under human rights codes – of characterizing labour rights as 
human rights – is not free of risk or controversy. The arguments invoke the long-
standing debate over labour rights as human rights; an ongoing debate among those 
sympathetic to unions since the advent of the Charter – one between, in Professor 
Brian Etherington's terms, Charter “romantics,” “realists,” and “pragmatists.”73 
There are certainly those who have seen Charter rights (and the use of the language 
of human rights generally) as a welcome addition to the labour field74 and caution 
that exclusion from constitutional discourse leaves labour vulnerable to government 
action,75 or who at least view a human-rights based rhetoric as having potential.76 
But there are also ample and valid criticisms of viewing labour rights through the 
lens of human rights discourse. There has been and is significant hostility within the 
labour relations community to rights- or Charter-based analysis of labour law. Such 
hostility is perfectly understandable, whether it is based on distrust of the judiciary77 
after a “century of bruising encounters with judges determined to manipulate the 
                                                 
73 Brian Etherington, “An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws Under the Charter: Of Realists, 
Romantics and Pragmatists” (1992) 24 Ottawa L Rev 685.  
 
74 E.g. Roy Adams, “The Revolutionary Potential of Dunmore” (2003), 10 CLELJ 117 [Adams, 
“Dunmore”], Roy Adams, “From Statutory Right to Human Right: The Evolution and Current Status of 
Collective Bargaining” (2008) 12 Just Labour 48 [Adams, “From Statutory Right to Human Right”], and 
Adams, Labour Left Out, supra note 16; Ken Norman, “What’s Right is Right: The Supreme Court Gets 
It” (2008) 12 Just Labour 16; Guy Davidov, “Judicial Development of Labour Rights – Contextually” 
(2010) 15(2) CLELJ 235; David Beatty, Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutional Labour 
Code (Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 1987); Canadian Foundation for Labour Rights 
website, online: <www.labourrights.ca>. 
 
75 E.g. David Beatty, “Labouring Outside the Charter” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ 839; Alan Hyde, 
“Exclusion is Forever: How Keeping Labour Rights Separate from Constitutional Rights Has Proven to 
Be a Bad Deal for American Trade Unions and Constitutional Law” (2010) 15(2) CLELJ 251. 
 
76 Judy Fudge, “Labour Rights as Human Rights: Turning Slogans into Legal Claims” (2014) 37 Dal LJ 
601; Bradley Walchuk, “The Best of Both Worlds: A Pragmatic Approach to the Construction of Labour 
Rights as Human Rights” (2009) 14 Just Labour 75 [Fudge, “Labour Rights as Human Rights”]. Both 
Fudge and Walchuk have also expressed skepticism, or at least caution, about the value of rights discourse 
or rights litigation in the labour field: Judy Fudge, “Labour, Courts, and the Cunning of History” (2010) 
16 Just Labour 1 and Judy Fudge, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively: 
The Implications of the Health Services and Support case in Canada and Beyond” (2008)  37 Indus LJ 25; 
Bradley Walchuk, “Union Democracy and Labour Rights: A Cautionary Tale” (2011) 2:2 Global Labour J 
106. 
 
77 E.g. Eric Tucker, “The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of Labour History in 
the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 61 Labour/Le Travail 151; Judy Fudge; Michael Mandel, The 
Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thomson Educational Publishing, 
Inc, 1994) at ch 5; Harry Arthurs, “‘The Right to Golf’: Reflections on the Future of Workers, Unions and 
the Rest of Us Under the Charter” (Labour Law Under the Charter, delivered at the School of Industrial 
Relations and Faculty of Law, Queen’s University, 24-26 September 1987) [Labour Law Under the 
Charter]. 
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common law and legislation to extinguish rights of workers”;78 scepticism over the 
efficacy or practicality of rights litigation as a means of protecting labour rights;79 or 
concerns regarding rights-based rhetoric or legalism in labour relations or more 
generally.80 While the Supreme Court has recognized, in what could almost be 
described as a throw-away line, that the Charter protects collective rights as well as 
individual rights,81 that cannot be a full answer to the skeptics.  
 
A more substantive response, at least within the scope of this paper, may be 
found in the nature of human rights commissions, which I canvassed earlier. Human 
rights complaints are relatively inexpensive to pursue, compared to constitutional 
litigation. And the ostensibly less adversarial nature of processes under human rights 
legislation may mean that labour rights under human rights legislation would not 
necessarily fall into a rights model that is individualistic, atomistic, or inherently 
corrosive to collective labour rights. But, on the other hand, the guiding (or, less 
charitably, paternalistic) hand of the Commission in its carriage of complaints may 
also serve to stifle class consciousness and radicalism, just as (in some skeptics’ 
view) does the Charter. 
 
I am not convinced that the skeptics are entirely wrong. Just as with rights 
discourse, applying human rights legislation to labour rights has its risks. While, in 
                                                 
78 Sandra Freedman, “Scepticism Under Scrutiny: Labour Law and Human Rights” in Tom Campbell et 
al, eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 197. 
 
79 E.g. Harry Arthurs, “The Constitutionalization of Employment Relations: Multiple Models, Pernicious 
Problems” (2010) 19 Soc & Leg Stud 43, and Harry Arthurs “Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers to 
Organize, Bargain and Strike: The Sight of One Shoulder Shrugging” (2010) 15(2) CLELJ 373 [Arthurs, 
“Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers”]; Bob Hepple, “The Right to Strike in an International 
Context” (2010) 15(2) CLELJ 133; Harry Arthurs & Brent Arnold, “Does the Charter Matter?” (2005) 11 
Rev Const Stud 37; Bryan Palmer, “What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Historical Considerations on Class 
Struggle, Boundaries of Constraint, and Capitalist Authority” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ 465; Paul JJ 
Cavalluzzo, “Freedom of Association – its Effect upon Collective Bargaining and Trade Unions” in 
Labour Law Under the Charter, supra note 77 at 267 [Freedom of Association]; Charles W Smith, 
“Labour, Courts and the Erosion of Workers' Rights in Canada” in Stephanie Ross & Larry Savage, eds, 
Rethinking the Politics of Labour in Canada (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2012) 184. See also Larry 
Savage & Charles W Smith, Unions in Court: Organized Labour and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017). For an interesting view on the interaction between human rights and 
labour rights, specifically regarding the agendas and perspectives of organizations and activists within the 
labour movement and human rights movement, see Kevin Kolben, “Labor Rights as Human Rights?” 
(2009–2010) 50 Va J Int’l L 449. 
 
80 E.g. Palmer, supra note 79; Susannah Quail, “Labour Rights and Labour Politics under the Charter 
(2013-2014), 45 Ottawa L Rev 343 (specifically regarding the “de-radicalizing” effect of Charter 
litigation at p 359) Eric Tucker, “Labor's Many Constitutions (And Capital's Too)” (2012) 33 Comp Lab L 
& Pol'y J 355; Harry Arthurs, “Labour Law Without the State?” (1996) 46 UTLJ 1 at 40 (legalistic 
approaches as “corrosive” to collective bargaining) and Harry Arthurs, “The New Economy and the New 
Legality: Industrial Citizenship and the Future of Labour Arbitration” (1999) 7 CLELJ 45; Larry Savage, 
“Labour Rights as Human Rights? A Response to Roy Adams” (2008) 12 Just Labour 68. More generally, 
see Allan Hutchinson and Andrew Petter, “Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter” 
(1988) 38 UTLJ 278; Allan Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold: Critical Essays on Modern Legal 
Thought (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 14 and 21 (the power of rights discourse and the risks of being co-
opted thereby). 
 
81 MPAO, supra note 2 at paras 64–65. 
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the end, I keep returning to the old maxim in Ashby – the right already exists, and I 
am simply exploring the remedy – this is not a complete answer either (after all, s. 
2(d) plainly exists and the Charter debate remains). At the same time, the potential 
of human rights legislation to over-run or corrode labour rights seems much less than 
the potential of the Charter, for instance, given the existence and prevalence of 
Wagnerist labour legislation. That is, regardless of how interesting the legal 
questions may be, a freedom of association guarantee within human rights legislation 
will likely to be seen as a "poor cousin" of more robust Wagner Act model 
protections. However, depending on the content of freedom of association, a human 
rights guarantee may even strengthen non-legalistic approaches. For instance, if 
freedom of association protects the right to strike, it may provide for greater use of 
the strike outside of labour relations legislation.82 In the end, I would argue that 
“labour rights as human rights” in the context of human rights codes might be less 
problematic than within rights discourse generally, but like rights discourse remains 
one of many options and alternatives open to workers and to labour. 
 
 
4.  What is Freedom of Association? 
 
Of course, much of the foregoing depends on exactly what freedom of association 
means. The definition of “freedom of association” provided by the Supreme Court 
now provides a relatively expansive web of rights and obligations. This new 
formulation has not been without criticism.83 However, for the purposes of this 
article I intend to take the Supreme Court at its word, and apply freedom of 
association as the Supreme Court has framed it. But it does not automatically follow 
that freedom of association under human rights codes will include the same rights as 
freedom of association under the Charter. Freedom of association under provincial 
codes may provide the full range of rights and protections that we see under s. 2(d); 
or only some of them; or may provide different rights and protections entirely. While 
I will argue that freedom of association under s. 2(d) and under provincial human 
rights legislation are more or less synonymous, that conclusion is not a given and in 
some ways, treating freedom of association as a single unified concept creates 
greater challenges that must be addressed. 
 
                                                 
82 This is itself problematic as it may undermine the existing labour relations regime, including the peace 
obligation. This will be examined further below. 
 
83 I do not intend to engage in a fulsome review or critique of the Supreme Court's section 2(d) 
jurisprudence; that has been done elsewhere. Among many others, see Brian Langille, “The 
Condescending Constitution (or, The Purpose of Freedom of Association is Freedom of Association)” 
(2016) 19 CLELJ 335 [Langille, “Condescending Constitution”]; Brian Langille, “The Freedom of 
Association Mess: How We Got into It and How We Can Get out of It” (2009) 54 McGill LJ 177 
[Langille, “Freedom of Association Mess”]; Brian Etherington, “The Right to Strike Under the Charter 
after Saskatchewan Federation of Labour: Applying the New Standard to Existing Regulation of Strike 
Activity” (2016) 19 CLELJ 492; Keir Vallance, “Developments in Labour Law – Freedom of Association 
and Labour Law at the Supreme Court: The 2014-2015 Term” (2016) 72 SCLR 227; Arthurs, 
“Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers”, supra note 79. 
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i. Freedom of Association under s. 2(d) 
 
Freedom of association most obviously includes the right to form, join, and maintain 
associations - the "thinnest" labour rights. The Supreme Court recognized this even 
in the notorious Alberta Reference.84 The Court has characterized this approach as 
the “constitutive” approach to freedom of association, and while it continues to be 
protected by section 2(d), the “derivative” approach (associational activity that 
“specifically relates to other constitutional freedoms”) and the “purposive” approach 
(which looks at the overall purpose of the constitutional guarantee) are also protected 
under the Charter.85 Indeed the Court has now fully endorsed the “generous and 
purposive” approach to freedom of association.86 
  
The arguments put forward in this paper are not, of course, inherently tied 
to ‘state-enforced isolation’ or other criteria put forward by the Supreme Court that 
are clearly aimed at governmental action. But as referenced previously, the Court 
also noted that a purpose of freedom of association is to prevent individuals from 
being overwhelmed by the powerful (such as a government or employer) and that it 
is aimed at “reducing social imbalances”. The reach of freedom of association in 
principle seems to extend beyond governmental action, even though the Charter 
itself may not. 
 
Within the labour context specifically, the heart of the “new” freedom of 
association is the right to “meaningful collective bargaining.”87 It is from this right 
that other labour rights appear to emanate. In BC Health Services, it was defined “the 
ability of workers to engage in associational activities, and their capacity to act in 
common to reach shared goals related to workplace issues and terms of employment. 
In brief, the protected activity might be described as employees banding together to 
achieve particular work-related objectives.”88 In Fraser, it was described as 
“meaningful association in pursuit of workplace goals.”89 In MPAO, the Court 
further defined “meaningful collective bargaining” to mean “a process that gives 
employees meaningful input into the selection of their collective goals, and a degree 
of independence from management sufficient to allow members to control the 
activities of the association, having regard to the industry and workplace in 
question.”90 
  
The right to “meaningful collective bargaining” contains numerous sub-
rights. From MPAO, we know that it includes the right of workers to be represented 
                                                 
84 Alberta Reference, supra note 22 at para 143 per Le Dain J. 
 
85 MPAO, supra note 2 at paras 52-56. 
 
86 Ibid at para 46. 
 
87 MPAO, supra note 2 at para 5. 
 
88 BC Health Services, supra note 2 at para 89. 
 
89 Fraser, supra note 2 at para 42. 
 
90 MPAO, supra note 2 at para 99. 
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by a bargaining agent where workers have "a degree of choice and independence 
sufficient to enable them to determine their collective interests and meaningfully 
pursue them."91 In the context of MPAO, “choice” and “independence” were 
analyzed in relation to a government-imposed labour relations scheme that did not, in 
the majority’s view, adequately protect RCMP members’ freedom of association.92 
This is obviously distinct from a private sector scenario; non-governmental 
employers do not have the luxury of using statutory muscle to impose a labour 
relations regime upon their employees. However, the basic principle that workers 
have a right to determine their collective interests and pursue them would be relevant 
in any workplace. 
 
 The right to meaningful collective bargaining also appears to include a duty 
on employers (and, one assumes, workers) to bargain in good faith. In BC Health 
Services, the Court held that s. 2(d)’s guarantee included a requirement that “both 
employer and employees…meet and…bargain in good faith, in the pursuit of a 
common goal of peaceful and productive accommodation.”93 The majority in Fraser 
endorsed this duty94 – certainly to the basic level that “employers and trade unions 
should negotiate in good faith and endeavour to reach an agreement95 – though the 
value of Fraser as a precedent is admittedly questionable at this point.96 And, indeed, 
the Court’s ruling in Fraser ultimately upheld a labour relations statute that arguably 
did not include an enforceable right to bargain, but rather an obligation merely to 
“listen in good faith.”97 Meredith further muddied the waters in refusing to require 
governments to consult with the workers affected (or their bargaining agents) prior to 
rolling back bargained-for wage increases.98 
 
 The characterization of the duty as a “duty to listen in good faith” rather 
than the Wagnerist “duty to bargain in good faith” was arguably strengthened by the 
                                                 
91 Ibid at para 81. 
 
92 Ibid at para 5. 
 
93 BC Health Services, supra note 2 at para 90. See also Justice Rothstein’s dissent in MPAO at para 169. 
 
94 Fraser, supra note 2 at paras 40ff. 
 
95 Ibid at para 95 
 
96 Professor Etherington has suggested MPAO has relegated Fraser to “rulings that shall be ignored”: 
Etherington, supra note 40 at 447.  
 
97 Quail, supra note 80 at 358. 
 
98 Meredith, supra note 2 at paras 25ff. The majority held that the government employer had not precluded 
consultation on other compensation issues and did not prevent future consultation on wages, and that the 
impact of the wage rollbacks were consistent with those in other government departments with which the 
government had consulted; therefore, the government had not infringed s. 2(d). This certainly suggests 
that even if there is a “duty to bargain” generally, a government need not bargain with every group of 
workers affected. This is in contrast with Justice Abella, who in her dissent argued that the lack of 
consultation with affected workers, in itself, would render the wage rollbacks unconstitutional (at paras 
62ff). 
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Supreme Court’s recent endorsement of Donald JA’s dissent in BCTF v BC.99 Justice 
Donald suggested that, at least for governments, the duty to bargain under s. 2(d) was 
explicitly not the Wagnerist duty to bargain in good faith100 but rather a more general 
duty: 
 
Parties are required to meet and engage in meaningful dialogue where 
positions are explained and each party reads, listens to, and considers 
representations made by the other party. Parties’ positions must not be 
inflexible and intransigent, and parties must honestly strive to find a 
middle ground. In order to determine whether the government is 
bargaining in good faith, it may sometimes be necessary to probe and 
consider the government’s substantive negotiating position.101 
 
 Later in BCTF, Justice Donald chided the B.C. government for not 
“listening in good faith” and framed the duty to listen in good faith as the “absolute 
minimum that is required from the employer.”102 
 
 This is arguably more general than the Wagnerist duty to bargain in good 
faith, where parties are explicitly legally obliged to attempt to finalize a collective 
agreement as defined by labour relations legislation.103 Nonetheless, Fraser’s 
exhortation for governments and their employees to “endeavour to reach an 
agreement”, and BCTF’s reference to finding “middle ground”, suggest that while a 
collective agreement – in the sense of a legally binding agreement between the 
parties104 – may not be the ultimate goal under the constitutional duty to bargain, 
there must at least be an attempt by both (or all) sides to resolve the parties’ 
differences.  
 
 Regardless of the characterization, however, it seems clear that a 
government employer has a duty to at least consider proposals from its unionized 
                                                 
99 British Columbia Teacher’s Federation v BC, 2016 SCC 49, [2016] 2 SCR 407, rev’g British Columbia 
Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2015 BCCA 184 [BCTF BCCA]. Notably the Court did not 
fully canvass the issue, stating only that the majority was allowing the appeal “substantially for the 
reasons of Justice Donald.” It is therefore not certain that the Supreme Court has fully embraced Justice 
Donald’s reasons nor that it will ultimately give a full-throated endorsement to the “duty to listen in good 
faith” should it have the opportunity. 
 
100 BCTF BCCA at paras 337–338. 
 
101 Ibid at para 348. 
 
102 Ibid at para 362. 
 
103 For example, SEA, supra note 8 at s 6-1(e), defines “collective bargaining” as, inter alia, “negotiating 
in good faith with a view to the conclusion of a collective agreement or its renewal or revision…” But see 
Rothstein J’s dissent in SFL, supra note 2 at para 131, questioning whether a right to strike is necessary in 
light of a constitutional duty to bargain in good faith. It is not clear, however, by what means a union or 
workers would enforce the constitutional duty in the absence of statutory unfair labour practice 
protections. 
 
104 As I will explore below, a requirement to come to a collective agreement outside of a Wagnerist labour 
statute is complicated by the common law refusal to recognize collective agreements as binding: see 
Young, supra note 8. 
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employees – it cannot simply refuse to listen and legislate the result it wishes. The 
application of the duty to bargain (or to listen) on non-governmental employers is 
perhaps less clear.  
 
 Freedom of association also includes the right to strike. The strike is – to 
use the Supreme Court’s wording – the “powerhouse of collective bargaining”105, an 
“essential component of the process through which workers pursue collective 
workplace goals”106 – “unique and fundamental” to effective collective bargaining.107 
But the right to strike’s status within s. 2(d) also remains unclear. The language used 
in SFL appears to relegate the right to strike as protected only insofar as that right 
promotes “meaningful collective bargaining.”108 However Professor Etherington, for 
one, argues that the Supreme Court’s language in SFL is more consistent with the 
right to strike as a “stand-alone right” than as a “derivative” right.109 The 
characterization of the right to strike may have implications on whether protest 
strikes, for instance, are protected strike activity.  
 
 
ii. Freedom of Association under Provincial Codes 
 
Section 5 of the YHRA reads: 
 
Every individual and every group shall, in accordance with the law, enjoy 
the right to peaceable assembly with others and the right to form with 
others associations of any character. 
 
The SHRC reads, at s. 6: 
 
Every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to peaceable 
assembly with others and to form with others associations of any character 
under the law. 
 
And in the Québec Charter, at s. 3, the freedom is phrased thusly: 
                                                 
105 SFL, supra note 2 at para 55 
 
106 Ibid at para 46. 
 
107 Ibid at para 51. 
 
108 SFL, supra note 2 at paras 24–25:  
Along with their right to associate, speak through a bargaining representative of 
their choice, and bargain collectively with their employer through their 
representative, the right of employees to strike is vital to protecting the meaningful 
process of collective bargaining within s. 2(d)…Where strike action is limited in a 
way that substantially interferes with a meaningful process of collective bargaining, 
it must be replaced by one of the meaningful dispute resolution mechanisms 
commonly used in labour relations. [Emphasis added.]  
See also Langille, “Condescending Constitution”, supra note 83 at 351. 
 
109 Etherington, supra note 40 at 450. 
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Every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom 
of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association. 
 
Historically, courts and tribunals have tended to treat fundamental freedoms 
under provincial codes as synonymous with the comparable freedoms under the 
Charter.110 For example, in Syndicat Northcrest111 the Supreme Court applied the 
same analysis to freedom of religion under the Québec Charter as it did to freedom 
of religion under the Charter. Freedom of expression under the Saskatchewan Code 
has been interpreted as being much the same freedom as that in s. 2(b) of the 
Charter,112 and freedom of association has been treated as a single concept 
regardless of whether it appears in provincial legislation or under the Charter.113  
 
The SHRC guarantee, notably, does not reference “freedom of association,” 
but rather the “right...to form with others associations...”114 The wording might be 
more suggestive of the “constitutive” model of freedom of association. Nonetheless 
in Dunmore v Ontario, the right to “form and maintain associations” was held to be 
the interest at stake in s. 2(d), and the definition of s. 2(d) has of course expanded 
since 2001.115 On the face of it, it would seem that s. 6 of the SHRC protects the 
same fundamental freedom as is found in s. 2(d) of the Charter and that similar 
interpretive principles would apply.116  
                                                 
110 The parallels between anti-discrimination provisions within provincial codes, on the one hand, and 
section 15 equality rights under the Charter, on the other, are not always so clearly and easily drawn. 
However, in that regard see e.g. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v 
BCGSEU, [1999] 3 SCR 3, 176 DLR (4th) 1 [Meiorin] at para 17ff; Quebec (Commission des droits de la 
personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Montréal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et 
des droits de la jeunesse) v Boisbriand (City), [2000] 1 SCR 665 at para 34ff, 185 DLR (4th) 385 
(applying s 15 jurisprudence in interpreting anti-discrimination provisions under the Québec Charter). The 
difference is in application (the Charter does not apply to private entities) and in exhaustive (human rights 
codes) versus non-exhaustive (open-ended analogous grounds in s. 15) grounds of discrimination: 
McIntyre J (dissenting in the result) in Law Society of British Columbia et al v Andrews et al (1989), 56 
DLR (4th) 1 at 18. 
 
111 Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551. Many other cases effectively treat 
the various freedoms as synonymous; see for example Proulx c Québec (PG), 2015 QCCS 1042 
(expression and association). 
 
112 Whatcott v the Queen and the University of Regina, 2002 SKQB 399 at para 29, 201 CRR (2d). 
 
113 See e.g. Gould, supra note 60; Syndicat des employées et employés professionnels et de bureau, section 
locale 573 (CTC-FTQ) c Commission de la construction du Québec, 2014 QCCA 368 [Syndicat des 
employées]; Johner’s Homestyle Catering v RWDSU Loc 568 (2 November 2010), Regina, unreported, 
aff'd (in this regard) 2012 SKQB 539 [Johner's]. 
 
114 This is no doubt due to its vintage; it predated the Charter by some 35 years, the Québec Charter by 
over 25, and even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, 
Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) 71) by a year.  
 
115 Dunmore, supra note 6 at para 17. 
 
116 Arbitrator Norman so found in Johner’s, supra note 113. The fact that it is phrased as a “right” in the 
Code rather than a “freedom” would not appear to make any difference to the scope of the provision, as 
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However, while courts and tribunals have more or less treated “freedom of 
association” as a single concept, with much the same meaning under provincial 
legislation as it would have under the Charter, that is not an end to the inquiry. 
Courts and tribunals have not had to interpret the application of the purposive model 
of freedom of association in the labour context except when dealing with already-
unionized employees.117 All of the cases thus far have viewed freedom of association 
through the lens of the Wagner Act model.  
 
As noted above, the Supreme Court in MPAO held the fundamental purpose 
of s. 2(d) to be “to protect the individual from ‘state-enforced isolation in the pursuit 
of his or her ends’”; this clearly is targeted at governments. But s. 2(d) also “prevents 
individuals from being overwhelmed by the powerful while at the same time 
providing collective strength” – a more general statement that arguably has 
application beyond actions by the state. Furthermore, Justice Donald in BCTF noted 
the particular concerns that animate the government’s constitutional duty to bargain. 
The relationship between a government and its employees is not the same as the 
relationship between a private employer and its employees for at least two reasons. 
First, government must represent the public, which includes the workers it 
employs.118 And second, a government has the power to “unilaterally resolve 
impasse through legislation, or force workers to end a strike through constitutionally 
compliant back-to-work legislation.”119 In other words, the government has a broad 
public duty, but also holds a legislative trump card in its labour relations. A 
government must listen in good faith, perhaps, but once it has done so, it is arguably 
free to legislate as it sees fit. 
 
We therefore see three employee rights, and three corresponding employer 
duties. First, workers120 have the right to organize into independent employee 
associations, and the corresponding duty upon employers to recognize those 
associations. Outside of a Wagnerist model, this right and duty may have troubling 
implications, including a duty to recognize non-majoritarian employee associations. 
Second, workers have a right to collectively bargain; employers have a 
corresponding duty to bargain (or at least listen) in good faith. Third, workers have a 
right to strike; employers may have a corresponding duty not to discipline or dismiss 
workers who strike - a duty of non-retaliation. 
                                                                                                                   
the Supreme Court has rejected a strict division between positive and negative rights: Fraser, supra note 2 
at para 69. 
 
117 For example, both Johner’s, supra note 113, and Syndicat des employées, supra note 113. Syndicat des 
employées involved employees who were already operating under a Wagnerist labour relations model.  
 
118 BCTF BCCA, supra note 99 at para 338. 
 
119 Ibid at para 339.  
 
120 An open question, to which I do not have a satisfactory answer, would be whether associational rights 
would also accrue to those workers who are excluded from Wagnerist legislation – for instance 
managerial employees, employees who operate in a confidential capacity, etc. – but there seems no 
principled reason why these rights would not apply. 
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 Of course, the correspondence between governments and private employers 
is not exact. A private employer does not have the duty to represent the public at 
large; nor, obviously, does it have the power to impose a contract upon its workers. 
This may suggest that a provincial freedom of association guarantee is not 
necessarily the same as the constitutional guarantee, but there are counter-arguments 
in this regard. 
 
First, human rights codes apply to both the private sector and the public 
sector.121 It is possible that a provincial code would apply differently based on 
whether the act complained of was performed by a private employer or a public 
employer, but such a distinction does not appear within the legislation itself. 
 
Second, while a private employer does not have the power to unilaterally 
resolve an impasse, employees remain vulnerable in many if not most employment 
situations.122 An employer may, for instance, absent an attempt by employees to 
exercise collective rights under a Wagnerist statute,123 certainly take action to 
dismiss (or explicitly or implicitly threaten to dismiss) employees who are 
attempting to collectively bargain, and may dismiss (or accept the repudiation of 
employment contracts by) employees who dare to strike. This dismissal may not be 
for just cause,124 and the employer may therefore be required to provide notice of 
dismissal or pay in lieu, but the employees will still be dismissed and out of the 
workplace. While by no means does a private employer hold the same powers as a 
government, it may still hold considerable power over those workers whom they 
employ, and the animating principles of freedom of association would seem to be 
applicable. 
 
Nonetheless, it is possible that freedom of association under human rights 
codes simply does not include the same web of rights and obligations that is included 
in the Charter as it applies within a Wagnerist regime (or exclusion from such a 
regime). Perhaps it is limited to the "thinnest" labour rights, as were recognized in 
the Alberta Reference, and does not include “thicker” rights such as a right to 
collective bargaining or a right to strike. Or perhaps the freedom is limited to the 
right to do collectively what one has the right to do individually, as Professor 
Langille has argued.125 While, for reasons given, I do not believe freedom of 
                                                 
121 SHRC, supra note 11, s 43; YHRA, supra note 11, s 38. 
 
122 See e.g. Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, 59 DLR (4th) 416. 
 
123 As discussed previously, ULP protections are often limited to the exercise of rights under a particular 
labour relations statute – so attempts to unionize or collectively bargain outside of that scheme would not 
necessarily have the same protections. 
 
124 Traditionally it likely would have been. In more recent times, where workplace discipline must be 
proportionate to the offence (McKinley v BC Tel, 2001 SCC 38, [2001] 2 SCR 161) and where the right to 
strike has been constitutionally affirmed, I would tentatively suggest that striking may be grounds for 
discipline but not dismissal. 
 
125 See Langille, “Condescending Constitution”, supra note 83 and Langille, “Freedom of Association 
Mess”, supra note 73.  
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association is necessarily so limited within human rights legislation, it is worth 
addressing these alternative conceptions of freedom of association. 
 
The first alternative – the "constituitive" model of freedom of association – 
was roundly rejected by the Supreme Court in MPAO. The same model may be 
rejected regarding human rights codes for the same reasons. A general and purposive 
interpretation of the governing legislation arguably leads to the same conclusion 
regarding human rights codes as it does regarding the Charter (as was discussed 
earlier in this article). A right to meaningful collective bargaining is just as justified 
under human rights codes as under the Charter, and for similar reasons.  
 
The difficulty with the second alternative is that if freedom of association is 
merely the right to do collectively what one could do individually, any “right to 
collective bargaining” becomes difficult to justify. At common law, collective 
agreements are not enforceable, and while strikes are not necessarily illegal, they are 
invariably justification for dismissal, and may give rise to liability in tort. As 
Professor Judy Fudge has noted,126 emphasizing symmetry between an individual 
right and a collective analogue (for example, the right to strike) conceals the inherent 
legal inequality that continues to suffuse employment law. In the present context, 
unless certain duties are recognized upon employers – at the very least, the duty of 
non-retaliation – a human rights code freedom of association guarantee remains more 
or less mute within the labour context. 
 
 
5. Application 
 
Of course, even if freedom of association under human rights codes is more or less 
the same as freedom of association under the Charter, how is it to be applied? The 
Devil, as they say, is in the details. 
 
In the sections that follow I examine three uncontroversial applications of 
freedom of association under human rights legislation – aspirational, interpretive, 
and complementary – and three applications that I would imagine are much more 
controversial – the duty upon an employer to, first, recognize non-Wagnerist 
employee associations; second, to bargain; and third, to refrain from retaliating 
against workers who strike. 
 
i. Freedom of Association as Aspirational 
 
In addition to their investigative role, human rights commissions have an educational 
and aspirational role,127 to promote, and educate the public about, the rights protected 
                                                 
126 See Fudge, “Labour Rights as Human Rights”, supra note 76 at 613–615. 
 
127 YHRA, supra note 11, s 16 (though the YHRA in this regard seems more specifically targeted at anti– 
discrimination measures); SHRC, supra note 11 at s 25 – though, again, the emphasis for much of s 25 
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by human rights legislation. As noted previously, it was for this reason that Professor 
Adams argued that governments should add freedom of association under Canadian 
human rights legislation. Professor Adams viewed such a move as aspirational and 
educational – “proclaiming loudly that [labour rights] are rights equivalent to 
employment equity”.128 Professor Adams viewed this as part of a general strategy to 
bring about a “tripartite consensus” between government, employers, and unions 
(and the public at large) to create a culture friendlier to collective bargaining.129 
  
Freedom of association has been present in human rights legislation for 
some time – in Saskatchewan, since 1947 – and it appears to have received little 
attention to date. But there is nothing in principle now preventing human rights 
commissions in Yukon, Saskatchewan, or Québec – or indeed elsewhere – from 
disseminating information on, and promoting, the new, purposive model of freedom 
of association. 
 
 
ii. Freedom of Association as Interpretive 
 
Freedom of association within human rights codes can also serve as an interpretive 
tool, particularly when there are competing rights or freedoms – such as the potential 
conflict between freedoms of expression and association, on the one hand, and non-
discrimination provisions on the other. For example, in one notable decision under 
an earlier version of the YHRA, Gould v Yukon Order of Pioneers, both the Yukon 
Supreme Court130 and the Yukon Court of Appeal131 considered freedom of 
association under the Act as a right that had to be balanced against the right of the 
applicant to demand non-discriminatory treatment. However when the case reached 
the Supreme Court of Canada,132 the majority was able to rule on the matter without 
considering freedom of association at all,133 though La Forest J argued in his 
concurring reasons that forcing association – in that case, forcing the respondent 
organization to accept female members – would act to "paralyze" the freedoms of 
expression and association.134 Similar “balancing” measures may take place under 
                                                                                                                   
relates to anti-discrimination provisions rather than the Bill of Rights. Nonetheless, s 25(b) (“The 
commission shall…promote an understanding and acceptance of, and compliance with, this Act”), at least, 
seems to apply. See also Québec Charter, supra note 11. 
 
128 Adams, Labour Left Out, supra note 16. 
 
129 Adams, “From Statutory Right to Human Right”, supra note 74 at 63. 
 
130 Gould v Yukon Order of Pioneers (1991), 87 DLR (4th) 618, 1991 CanLII 8298 (YK SC). 
 
131 Yukon (Human Rights Commission) v Yukon Order of Pioneers, Dawson Lodge #1 (1993), 100 DLR 
(4th) 596, 1993 CanLII 3415 (YK CA) 
 
132 Gould, supra note 60. 
 
133 Ibid at para 18. 
 
134 Ibid at para 74ff. McLachlin J (as she then was) strongly disagreed, noting that the very nature of anti-
discrimination law that it “limit the freedom of those who are in a position to discriminate” (at para 145).  
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the common law – though of course Charter freedoms, and Charter values, may 
serve the same purpose.135 
 
 
iii. Freedom of Association as a Complementary Remedy 
 
Another option is to apply freedom of association as a remedial ground within other 
proceedings. For example, the majority of the arbitration board in Johner’s 
Homestyle Catering v RWDSU Local 568136 found that the grievor had been harassed 
and demoted due to her activity on the part of the union. In addition to ordering that 
the grievor be compensated for lost wages, the board also ordered $10,000 in 
damages under The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code on the basis that the grievor's 
right to freedom of association – as defined by (at the time) BC Health Services – 
had been violated. This particular application of freedom of association does not 
seem to be controversial; collective agreements have been widely held to incorporate 
human rights and other employment-related statutes as implied terms.137 In labour 
arbitrations, then, it seems possible to use freedom of association as a basis for 
additional compensation for situations where an employee's freedom of association 
has been infringed: anti-union discrimination or animus, for instance, as in Johner's. 
The value and availability of such awards may be limited by the terms of the 
legislation.138 
  
But such application of freedom of association benefits those who are 
already unionized – who already have access to Wagnerist rights under labour 
legislation. It is less easy to apply such a remedy in individual wrongful dismissal 
claims. Canadian courts have been reluctant to imply statutory rights, particularly 
human rights codes, into individual contracts of employment.139 For the non-
                                                 
135 See e.g. Wakeling JA’s dissent in Wall v Judicial Committee of the Highwood Congregation of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2016 ABCA 255 at para 130ff (freedom of religion and freedom of association 
dictate that the courts should not intervene in religious organizations’ membership decisions). 
 
136 Gould, supra note 60; Johners, supra note 113. 
 
137 See Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v OPSEU, Local 324, [2003] 2 SCR 
157, 2003 SCC 42 [Parry Sound]; Government of Alberta v Alberta Union of Provincial Employees, 2013 
CanLII 29734 (AB GAA). Bisaillon v Concordia University, 2006 SCC 19 at para 33, [2006] 1 SCR 666, 
summarized it thusly: “This Court has considered the subject-matter jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators 
on several occasions, and it has clearly adopted a liberal position according to which grievance arbitrators 
have a broad exclusive jurisdiction over issues relating to conditions of employment, provided that those 
conditions can be shown to have an express or implicit connection to the collective agreement...” 
 
138 SHRC, supra note 11 at s 31.4, limits compensation to a maximum of $20,000.00 and to situations 
where the party who has contravened the Code has acted "wilfully and recklessly" or where the injured 
party has “suffered with respect to feeling, dignity, or self-respect as a result of the contravention.” YHRA, 
supra note 11, however, contains no such limitations, requiring simply that the Act be contravened (s 20), 
and placing no restriction on the quantum of damages (s 24). 
 
139 See e.g., Seneca College v Bhadauria, [1981] 2 SCR 181, 124 DLR (3d) 193 (refusal to recognize a 
tort of discrimination); Honda Canada Inc v Keays, 2008 SCC 39 at para 63, [2008] 2 SCR 362 (plaintiff 
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unionized, then, we must explore the possibility of direct application of freedom of 
association under human rights legislation. 
 
 
 iv. The Right to Organize / The Duty to Recognize 
 
Many workers will attempt to achieve, or will achieve, certification under Wagner 
Act style legislation; they may take advantage of their "thickest" Wagner Act model 
rights. My argument herein does not involve them directly. I am, rather, examining 
workers who seek non-Wagner Act bargaining; who eschew, either by choice or 
necessity, the Wagner Act model.140 This is likely through a form of minority, i.e. 
non-majoritarian, unionism, but it may also be for groups of workers who for 
whatever reason wish to collectively bargain but do not wish to assume the full 
panoply of Wagner Act rights.141 This has not been an option commonly pursued by 
Canadian workers, and the suggestion that non-Wagner unionism be legitimized has 
not gained widespread traction in the labour movement or elsewhere, not least 
because minority unionism, at least, carries real risks to labour rights in Canada.142 
However having a non-majoritarian alternative in addition to the option of the 
Wagnerist model has been long-championed by Professor Roy Adams and is perhaps 
more in keeping with international labour standards than is the existing single 
model.143  
 
The argument by Adams and other proponents of minority unionism is 
premised on statutory reform144 – that governments should implement legislation that 
                                                                                                                   
must pursue discrimination claim under human rights regime); Macaraeg v E Care Contact Centers Ltd, 
2008 BCCA 182, 295 DLR (4th) 358 (overtime); Schulz v Beacon Roofing Supply Canada Company, 
2016 BCSC 1475 (discrimination). Situations where the courts have been more open to pursuing statutory 
remedies in common law wrongful dismissal suits seem limited to where the statute lacks a 
comprehensive remedial scheme or where the statute does not clearly eliminate the common law remedy; 
see e.g. McCracken v Canadian National Railway Company, 2010 ONSC 4520, 3 CPC (7th) 81 (overtime 
under the Canada Labour Code). See also Evangelista v Number 7 Sales Limited, 2008 ONCA 599, 240 
OAC 389, where the Ontario Court of Appeal – without explicitly addressing this issue – upheld a lower 
court's award for statutory vacation and public holiday pay within a wrongful dismissal claim.  
 
140 One example of a statutory regime that is not reliant on majoritarianism or “trade unionism” as such is 
the Ontario Agricultural Employees Protection Act: Doorey, supra note 28 at 537. 
 
141 One side-issue is that non-Wagner Act unions and associations would arguably not be bound by the 
"duty of fair representation" towards their members, premised as that duty is on majoritarian exclusivity: 
Steele v Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co, 323 US 192 (1944); Canadian Merchant Service Guild v 
Gagnon et al, [1984] 1 SCR 509, 9 DLR (4th) 641. 
 
142 For concerns about minority unionism, see e.g. Brad Walchuk, "The Pitfalls of Embracing Minority 
Unionism" (2016) 6:3 J Workplace Rights 1. 
 
143 See Adams, “Dunmore”, supra note 74; Adams, “Compliance”, supra note 17. Professor Adams does 
not suggest replacing the Wagner Act model but rather introducing non-majoritarian options in addition to 
the Wagner Act model. 
 
144 Professor Adams argued that “the Charter protects the right of farm workers to organize, to bargain 
collectively in any format with which both they and their employers are comfortable, and to strike without 
putting their jobs in jeopardy or being punished for doing so – and that the onus is on the Ontario 
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will allow and protect workers’ right to organize into non-majoritarian unions. In 
keeping with the theme of this paper, however, I will examine the possibility of 
pursuing minority unionism through human rights codes.145 
  
When considering risks, it is important to keep in mind that freedom of 
association under human rights codes has no greater ability to challenge Canadian 
Wagner Act model statutes than does the Charter. In other words, the Supreme Court 
appears satisfied for now that Wagnerism is constitutional. This means that for so 
long as there is a Wagnerist option open to workers, the risks of minority unionism 
through human rights legislation are fundamentally limited. Unless and until 
Canadian courts rule that the existing labour relations model is unconstitutional, 
workers will still be able to organize under the auspices of Wagnerist statutes. That 
means that they may take advantage of the “thickest” labour rights, including 
exclusivity (an employer must bargain with the certified bargaining agent, and only 
the certified bargaining agent) and unfair labour practice protections that work to 
prevent employers from undermining the collective bargaining process. Human 
rights-driven minority unionism does not directly interfere with those rights and 
protections; rather, it will almost inevitably operate on the periphery of the Wagner 
Act model. 
 
 It is possible that a greater emphasis on, or an enforceable right of, non-
Wagnerist unionism would cause employers to promote such unions in bad faith, in 
order to dissuade workers from seeking majoritarian representation. But voluntary 
recognition under the Wagner Act model can be used in a similar manner.146  
 
 On the other hand, the very fact that human rights code-driven labour rights 
will operate outside of the Wagner Act model may demonstrate their value. The 
reach of Wagner Act unionism is short, and getting shorter, at least in the private 
sector. A duty upon employers to recognize employee associations even when those 
associations do not pursue certification may encourage recognition of labour rights 
among both employers and employees. It may legitimize labour rights; perhaps even 
serve as a "gateway" or half-measure which employees may pursue prior to then 
pursuing certification. 
 
 All of that said, the main goal of recognition is to pursue some form of 
collective bargaining, and so it is impossible to fully canvass the implications of a 
                                                                                                                   
government to formulate a policy that will effectively protect and promote those rights.” Adams, 
“Dunmore”, supra note 74.  
 
145 In so doing I remain all too aware of the perils that minority unionism might bring, especially without 
being part of a broader effort in statutory reform. It is tempting to let sleeping freedoms lie. However, for 
reasons that follow I suggest the risks in the context suggested in this paper are limited.  
 
146 E.g. an employer may voluntarily recognize a union perceived to be employer-friendly so as to 
dissuade employees from seeking representation by another, perhaps more assertive, certified bargaining 
agent.  
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duty to recognize an employee association without also considering the extent of the 
employer's duty to bargain.  
 
 
 v. The Right to Collectively Bargain / The Duty to Bargain in Good 
Faith 
 
It is possible to have collective agreements that exist independently of a Labour 
Relations Board order. Voluntary recognition, where an employer voluntarily agrees 
to accept a labour organization as the bargaining agent for a group of employees, is 
already recognized under labour statutes.147 In such situations, the employer and 
union are generally held to much the same standards as where a group of workers are 
represented by a certified bargaining agent. Generally, proof of majority support of a 
collective agreement, at least, is required in order to sustain a voluntarily recognized 
bargaining unit in the face of a certification application.148 In other words, voluntary 
recognition mimes Wagner Act majoritarianism.149 Non-majoritarian collective 
agreements seem to remain legally unenforceable.150 
  
Earlier, in the discussion regarding BCTF, I (and Donald JA, indeed) 
suggested that an employer's duty to bargain (or "listen") in good faith falls short of a 
duty to conclude a collective agreement. I will not repeat that analysis, but I will add 
that outside of a Wagnerist statute, an employer's duty perhaps cannot include a duty 
to conclude a collective agreement. I would suggest that recognition of freedom of 
association under human rights codes does not necessarily make non-Wagnerist 
collective agreements enforceable. Unlike under a Wagnerist statute,151 "collective 
bargaining" under a human rights code would not necessarily displace the individual 
contract of employment. Rather, any “collective bargaining” that would occur would 
in effect be an employer considering in good faith workplace policies of general 
application, or identical or nearly identical terms and conditions of employment 
among a group of employees' contracts of employment.152 
 
 Again, this is not an unreservedly good thing for employees. The Supreme 
Court has made it clear that an employer is not required to negotiate with all groups 
                                                 
147 E.g. Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1, ss 42–44; BC Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996, c 
244, s 34. 
 
148 See e.g. SGEU v SIAST, [1989] SLRBD No 37 at 14–15. 
 
149 See e.g. Ontario Workers’ Union v Service Employees International Union, Local 1, 2012 CanLII 
71553 (ON LRB) at para 18. 
 
150 See e.g. Ontario Secondary School Teachers Federation v Greater Essex District School Board, 2015 
CanLII 38721 (ON LA) (MacDowell) at para 100; Northstar Lumber v United Steelworkers of America, 
Local No 1-424, 2009 BCCA 173 at para 105, 308 DLR (4th) 22. 
 
151 McGavin Toastmaster Ltd v Ainscough, [1976] 1 SCR 718, 54 DLR (3d) 1. 
 
152 It is also possible that freedom of association, as set out by the Supreme Court, would require that the 
common law revisit Young, supra note 8, and effectively bestow “personhood” by judicial fiat upon trade 
unions, but I do not believe that to be a necessary precondition to some form of meaningful employee 
voice via some form of collective or quasi-collective bargaining. 
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of employees who seek to collectively bargain153 but it also does not prevent an 
employer from doing so. It does not in itself prevent an employer from, for instance, 
playing two employee associations against one another, or paying higher wages to 
those employees who choose not to engage in this form of quasi-collective 
bargaining. But the Supreme Court's jurisprudence does suggest that an employer 
cannot simply dismiss employee collective representations out of hand. Where an 
employer does so, or engages in anti-associational discrimination in the manner 
described, it may be a matter for a human rights complaint. Similarly, if an employer 
chooses to exercise its common law right to dismiss employees who attempt to 
engage in collective bargaining, that too would potentially fall within the scope of a 
human rights complaint. 
 
 In the result, a human rights commission would be empowered to bring an 
employer into mediation to attempt to resolve the complaint. That in itself may be 
sufficient to encourage good faith consideration of employee representations, and 
may further serve the aspirational goals of human rights legislation. If that were to 
fail, however, the remedies available would be much more limited than those 
available under labour relations legislation. A human rights tribunal (or in 
Saskatchewan, the Court of Queen’s Bench) would be empowered to order the 
reinstatement of dismissed employees,154 or to order compensation,155 but it would 
not seem to have the authority to force the parties to bargain in good faith, for 
instance, or to table or accept particular bargaining proposals. This remedial shortfall 
in itself will limit the scope of an employer's duty to bargain – but given the nature 
of the duty as set out by the Supreme Court, where it is a duty to consider but not to 
agree, perhaps that is as it should and must be.  
 
 
 
  vi. The Right to Strike / The Duty of Non-Retaliation 
 
I touched on the right of reinstatement above in the context of collective bargaining, 
but it has more significance when considering the right to strike. At the most basic 
level, a human rights complaint relating to freedom of association would allow for a 
right of workers not to suffer retaliation for attempting to exercise labour rights.156 
                                                 
153 MPAO, supra note 2 at para 83ff. 
 
154 YHRA, supra note 11, s 21; SHRC, supra note 11, s 31.3. While workers in the federal jurisdiction, it 
has now been confirmed, have the right of reinstatement in unjust dismissal complaints under the Canada 
Labour Code (Wilson v Atomic Energy Commission, 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 SCR 770), workers in most 
provincial jurisdictions do not. For workers who are fired for attempting to unionize under the existing 
labour relations regime, there are Unfair Labour Practices to protect their rights. But for workers who 
attempt to seek voluntary recognition of a bargaining agent, perhaps, or who seek to bargain as a group 
without seeking certification, or who undertake strike action, the right of reinstatement -not normally 
available at common law - may be of some significance.  
 
155 YHRA, supra note 11; SHRC, supra note 11, s 31.4; Québec Charter, supra note 11. 
 
 UNBLJ   RD UN-B  [VOL/TOME 68 
 
282 
 
That relatively straightforward principle presents challenges in the context of the 
right to strike. 
 
 Those workers who strike outside of the protections of labour relations 
legislation have, at common law, breached or repudiated their contracts of 
employment and also face the possibility of torts brought against them – inducement 
of breach of contract if they encourage other workers to join the strike; interference 
with economic relations by unlawful means (i.e. threat of breach of contract or 
tortious behaviour); or the torts of trespass and nuisance that are already used as a 
basis for injunctions when picketing is undertaken. And if the strikers are successful 
in achieving their goals, having achieved their ends through threat of illegal action, 
i.e. either a strike or another economic tort, they may be liable in intimidation.157 
 
The strike, however, is – to use the Supreme Court’s wording – the 
“powerhouse of collective bargaining”,158 an “essential component of the process 
through which workers pursue collective workplace goals”159 – “unique and 
fundamental” to effective collective bargaining.160 Professor Doorey noted that 
“thin” rights may be of limited benefit without the right to strike.161 A human rights 
code that includes freedom of association may provide an answer. Unlike the more 
nebulous Charter values,162 freedom of association within human rights codes may 
allow workers to directly challenge the common law, limiting the power of 
employers to discipline or discharge workers who strike or otherwise seek to 
exercise labour rights; as well as to challenge tort liability that may accrue.163 
 
That said, protecting a right to strike outside of the Wagner Act model is 
problematic. It would potentially herald a return to “recognition strikes”, where 
workers would use the strike, and not a certification process, to force an employer to 
collectively bargain. It could give rise to walkouts being used, as they were prior to 
the Wagner Act, to resolve workplace disputes, rather than resorting to arbitration. It 
would weaken, perhaps to absurdity, the restriction on strikes under labour 
legislation. These are significant challenges. If freedom of association includes the 
                                                                                                                   
156 See also YHRA, supra note 11, ss 29–30; SHRC, supra note 11, ss 35, 45. 
 
157 See e.g. Christie, supra note 7; Arthurs, “Constitutionalizing the Right of Workers”, supra note 79 at 
382. 
 
158 SFL, supra note 2 at para 55 
 
159 Ibid at para 46. 
 
160 Ibid at para 51. 
 
161 Doorey, supra note 28 at 539. 
 
162 See Hill, supra note 4 at para 83ff. However, to date Charter values do not seem to have been used to 
challenge common law hostility to strikes or collective agreements. 
 
163 I will note here again that, per Professor Fudge, the right to strike is a labour right that does not have an 
easy or appropriate individual corollary. An individual employee can certainly leave their job. However, it 
is only when it is done collectively that tort liability becomes likely, and the "strike" is at its heart distinct 
from an individual resignation. See Fudge, "Labour Rights as Human Rights", supra note 76. 
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right to strike, as the Supreme Court says it does, what does that mean under human 
rights legislation? 
 
For those workers operating within the Wagner Act model, it is almost 
certain that the restriction on strikes under labour relations legislation will pass 
constitutional muster. At least, appellate courts have previously upheld the restriction 
on mid-term strikes164 and Professor Etherington has suggested that recognition of 
the right to strike in SFL will not require a re-imagining of the existing model of 
labour relations.165 But that is premised on the Wagner Act model. One argument 
might be that strike restrictions within existing legislation is justifiable because 
workers accept a restriction on their strike activity as part of a “bundle” of Wagnerist 
rights and obligations. Workers operating outside of labour relations legislation do 
not gain the benefits of the legislation and, therefore, restricting their right to strike 
under statute may be less justifiable (under either the Charter or human rights 
legislation).  
 
It may also be that the Supreme Court’s ambiguity on the status of the right 
to strike limits the ambit of the right. If, as Abella J’s reasons suggest, the right to 
strike is necessarily tied to collective bargaining, then that may serve as an internal 
limit on the right to strike under human rights legislation. Strike activity or time off 
work that is not connected to the “meaningful association in pursuit of workplace 
goals” would not be protected under freedom of association. That, too, gives rise to 
definitional problems, of course. Surely using the strike to convince an employer to 
collectively bargain is in pursuit of workplace goals! 
 
It seems to me that the ultimate question will be whether human rights 
legislation or the Charter will require that the “peace obligation” be declared 
unconstitutional. Paradoxically, the right to strike under human rights legislation 
may require that, insofar as a strike is pursuing collective workplace goals, an 
employer is not entitled to retaliate (whether through discipline, or treating a contract 
as repudiated) against workers who strike. But it might not displace statutory 
restrictions that would render the strike outright illegal. In that case, and if the 
Supreme Court's s. 2(d) jurisprudence does lead us to this conclusion (and I am 
suggesting it does, though I am not entirely convinced of that conclusion myself), an 
employer whose non-unionized workers undertake strike action may be required to 
seek relief from a labour relations board. And if that is the case - if the strike remains 
restricted under the Wagner Act model, and hence workers' ability to access the 
                                                 
164 Grain Workers’ Union, Local 333 et al v British Columbia Maritime Employers Association et al, 2009 
FCA 201, [2010] 3 FCR 225 [Grain Workers], leave to appeal denied 2009 CanLII 71475 (SCC) (refusals 
to cross picket lines); British Columbia Teachers' Federation v British Columbia Public School 
Employers' Association, 2009 BCCA 39, 306 DLR (4th) 144 [BCTF (2009)], leave to appeal denied 2009 
CanLII 44624 (SCC) (mid-term protest strikes). See also Dickson CJ's reasons in the "Dairy Workers" 
case, RWDSU v Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 SCR 460 at para 29ff, 38 DLR (4th) 277; which suggest that 
strike prohibitions will be relatively easy to justify under s 1 of the Charter.  
 
165 See also Etherington, supra note 40. 
 UNBLJ   RD UN-B  [VOL/TOME 68 
 
284 
 
rights to organize and to collectively bargain is rendered more or less moot - then 
perhaps the Supreme Court has, despite its protestations, constitutionalized the 
Wagner Act after all. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The Supreme Court’s constitutional, administrative law, and human rights 
jurisprudence raises numerous questions regarding the application of constitutional 
labour rights to workers outside of the public sector. In most jurisdictions, the 
question regarding the private sector – except insofar as statutory prohibitions or 
provisions are involved – can be safely ignored. But in jurisdictions where freedom 
of association appears within human rights legislation, and therefore is applicable to 
and enforceable in the private sector, I suggest that such questions need closer 
examination. The Supreme Court has provided a model of freedom of association 
that invokes profound and important principles, and also creates a significant, if 
rudimentary, set of constitutional labour rights and obligations. The implications 
may be equally profound and important; or they may be much more limited. To 
determine which, it is important to determine where the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence logically leads. 
